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HOW FAR A CORPORATION CAN, UNDER STATE
STATUTES OR CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
(TO EFFECT THAT A CORPORATION CAN
ISSUE BONDS ONLY FOR MONEY OR ACT-
UAL PROPERTY RECEIVED), AUTHOR-
IZE THE ISSUE OF BONDS AS COL-
LATERAL SECURITY FOR AN AN-
TECEDENT INDEBTEDNESS
The powers of a corporation are granted and restricted by its
charter, together with the laws and constitution of the state of its
creation. The ascertaining of the manner in which corporations are
to be governed by laws extraneous to their charter, is a matter of
interpretation. A power which is given a corporation by the com-
mon law and also by state statute and by that same statute restricted
should be scrutinized more closely than statutes which are merely
directory.- For the interpretation of statutes we may look to the
decisions of the courts of a state, but when we find that, concerning
a certain portion of a statute, no direct decision has ever been ren-
dered and that the only decisions ever made in the state on the ques-
tion in point was in a case before the Federal Court of Appeals
within that state, the problem becomes more difficult.
The question of issuing bonds by a corporation is regulated in
most states by statutes and in the absence of statutes there is gen-
erally a constitutional provision covering the matter. Very few
states rely upon the common law.
The Missouri Constitution provides,1 "That no corporation shall
issue stock or bonds, except for money paid, labor done or property
actually received and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness
shall be void."
The words of the statute2 are "The stock or bonds of a corpora.
tion shall be issued only for money paid, labor done or property
actually received."
In the recent case of Mudge v. Black, Sheridan, Wilson et al.,
the Federal Court of Appeals, sitting in and for the Eighth District,
held, that bonds which were issued by a corporation and given to
1Constitution of Missouri, Article 12, Sec. 8.
2Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1909, Sec. 2891.
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a creditor of that corporation as security for an antecedent indebted-
ness owing to that creditor must be regarded, in the light of the
foregoing provisions, as invalid. It is to be understood that this
decision was made without the support of any decisions on the
point involved by the Supreme Court of Missouri. The practice
of the Federal Court sitting within a state to recognize the decisions
of that state could not be followed; their only resort then was to
the decisions of the Federal Courts and to the courts of other states.
Before proceeding to the point involved in the principal case,
mention should be made of the fact that bonds issued in settlement
or in absolute payment of an antecedent debt, which is bona fide, are
valid, and, that bonds duly issued to raise a present loan with
which to pay an antecedent bona fide indebtedness are also valid.
The question of a pledge or security is a different matter.
In order to be more brief and less monotonous, facts will be
stated analagous to the facts in the case of Kemmerer v. St. Louis
Blast Furnace Co.3 In that case there was a bill for foreclosure
and sale. The property, which was covered by mortgage or trust
deed, was sold and the proceeds were paid to the receiver appointed.
The defendant had executed and delivered promissory notes for a
pre-existing and past due indebtedness for goods, wares and mer-
chandise sold and delivered by payee in the note to the maker
thereof. There were collateral agreements in usual form reciting that
bonds of the defendant had been deposited with the complainant
as security for the payment of the notes. These bonds composed
a part of an issue of which all were equally secured by a certain
mortgage. The complainant sold these bonds at private sale and
they were purchased by a third party for the use and benefit of the
pledgees. Complainant obtained judgment against defendant on the
notes less amount received from sale of bonds. After private trans-
actions there was due certain amounts on the judgment and the
bonds. Both claims were presented for allowance as a secured claim
under mortgage. The Master disallowed these claims and on appeal
the Federal Court sustained the Master's report.
The statute provides that "all fictitious increase of stock or in-
debtedness shall be void."
Here the present indebtedness was not enlarged but a liability
arose which would be recoverable out of the assets of the corpora-
tion; the difference between the amounts that would be ultimately
realized from the enforcement of the pledges and the par value of
3Kemmerer v. Blast Furnace Co., 212 Fed. 63.
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the bonds pledged would increase the indebtedness of the company.
For example, suppose notes are given by a corporation for twenty
thousand dollars for a just antecedent debt and mortgage bonds are
pledged for one hundred thousand dollars to secure it, and the
pledge is foreclosed by decree of court, the bonds being sold for ten
thousand dollars to a third party. There then remains a debt of the
corporation of ten thousand dollars to the original creditor and a
debt of one hundred thousand dollars to the purchaser of the bonds.
The cause of the increase of the indebtedness from twenty thousand
dollars to one hundred and ten thousand dollars, of which ninety
thousand dollars would be without any valuable consideration and
fictitious, would be the original pledge of the bonds. Upon such
reasoning the Federal Court sustained the Master's report concerning
the fictitiousness of the indebtedness.
Besides declaring all fictitious increase of indebtedness invalid
the law requires that the bonds be issued for money paid. This
indebtedness did represent, at the time at which it was incurred, so
much property received, but the court interpreted the provisions to
mean the receipt of a present consideration for the issue of the
bonds and that the corporation receive for them an amount of value
equal to the par value of the bonds, in order that the amount of
stock and bonds should not misrepresent and deceive those who
dealt with the corporation. Here the corporation had the same
amount of assets the moment before it made the pledge that it had
thereafter, but thereafter, that portion of its assets covered by the
mortgages securing the bonds was incumbered by an additional
liability.
As to the interpretation of the provisions the court say, in ref-
erence to the contentions that the pre-existing debts represent so
much property received: "These interpretations of the terms of the
constitution and statutes for which counsel argue seem strained, un-
natural, and inconsistent with these familiar canons of construc-
tion; the plain, obvious, natural meaning should be preferred to any
curious hidden sense suggested by the meditation and ingenuity of
able and acute minds and the exigencies of the case. The object
which the enacting body sought to attain and the evil which that
body sought to remedy, may always be considered for the pur-
pose of ascertaining its intention, and that intention should be given
effect if the terms of the enactment do not render that result im-
possible. A rational, sensible construction, one that will advance the
remedy and repress the wrong, must be given if consonant with the
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES.
terms of the constitution and statute. The obvious, natural, reason-
able meaning of the inhibition of the provisions is that no corpora-
tion shall issue stock or bonds except in exchange for value equal in
amount to the par value of the stock or bonds, either in money paid,
labor done, or property actually received." '4
To enlarge on the interrogation whether the court rightly decided
the principal case in reference to the law of Missouri, we must, of
necessity, resort to, first, the earlier decisions of the courts of Mis-
souri concerning points extraneous to the present subject but in-
directly affecting it; second, to the Federal courts and then to the
decisions of other states.
In the case of Garrett v. Kansas City Milling Co.,5 the court
say: "When the constitution permits a subscriber to pay for stock
by labor done or property received, it means that the corporation
must receive, in labor or property, whit it was reasonably worth
in money. The property or labor must be .a fair, just, lawful and
needed equivalent for the money subscribed."
In Berry v. Rood6 the court say: "This clause in the constitution
puts a limit on the power of the legislature, so that if that body
should attempt, it could not authorize the organization 6f a corpora-
tion with power to issue stock without receiving its equivalent in
money, labor or property. It may be paid for in property, but in
such case the property must be the fair equivalent in value to the
par value of the stock issued therefor."
No question arises in this instance as to whether the decisions
relating to the issuance of stock and of bonds are to be treated
alike. Here we wish to ascertain the attitude of the court as re-
gards the provisions of the constitution and statutes. These few
cases are sufficient to bring to light the opinion of the Supreme
Court. From this vague collection of ideas concerning the question
in point the Federal court was called upon to decide the principal
case. Its decision may seem inharmonious with previous decisions
of that court, on first blush, but after close study the cases are dis-
tinguishable from the principal case.
We must remember throughout this discussion that it is seem-
ingly essential to an issuance of bonds that there be a present con-
4Mudge v. Black, Sheridan Wilson, 224 Fed. 919.5Garrett v. Milling Co., 113 Mo. 330.
Van Cleve v. Berkey, 143 Mo. 109.
Shickle v. Watts, 94 Mo. 410.
Hunter v. Land Cooperage Co., 246 Mo. 135.6Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 328.
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sideration received in exchange for the bonds and the consideration
must be of a value reasonably equal to the par value of the bonds.
The principal case so held.
The trend of the Federal courts in respect to such provisions as
are law in Missouri will now be considered.
The first case to be given consideration is that of The Farmer's
Loan and Trust Co. v. San Diego Street Car Co. 7 The court is very
plain in the interpretation which it gives to provisions similar to
those under consideration above. "This constitutional and statuiory
inhibition is plain, and has but one meaning-the money paid, labor
done or property actually received must be paid, performed or re-
ceived, as the case may be, on account of the issuance of the bonds;
and any bonds issued contrary to this provision are of course illegally
issued. The provision does not mean and cannot be held to mean,
that such bonds may be issued as collateral security for any sort of
pre-existing indebtedness. Now none of the bonds in question are,
or ever were, issued or held for money paid, labor performed or
property received on account of their issuance. On the contrary, all
of them were delivered and are held as collateral security in part
for a pre-existing indebtedness of the defendant corporation." That
statement is very precise in exemplifying the fact that there must
be a present consideration for an issuance of bonds and that the
giving of time for the payment of the debt is not such a present
consideration.
While the opinion in William Fricke v. South Carolina Loan and
Trust Co.,8 often cited contra, shows much incongruity in its cita-
tions, the law in that case is not inconsistent with the principal
case. The court say: "The constitution of the State of Arkansas
has a provision in every respect the same as that in the constitution
of the State of South Carolina which is now under consideration."
There is then cited Memphis R. R. Co. v. Dow,s" in which the court
explains the protective purpose of the provisions and the value of
that which may be received for the bonds issued and then con-
cludes: "Provided, always, the transaction is a real one, based upon
a present consideration, and having reference to legitimate corporate
purposes, and is not a mere device to evade the law and accomplish
that which is forbidden." In that case the company did not execute
notes and pledge their bonds for an antecedent debt; the bonds were
7Farmers Trust Co. v. San Diego Co., 45 Fed. 51.8Fricke v. S. C. Trust Co., 122 Fed. 569.
sa-Memphis R. R. Co. v. Dow, 120 U. S. 298,
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pleged for a present consideration; the pledges were made to obtain
funds with which to complete the purchase of machinery; and the
money obtained was actually used for that purpose. The court refers
to Nelson v. Hubbard, contra,9 and inclines to the view of that court
in regard to the pledging of bonds for an antecedent indebtedness.
That expression can only be regarded as dicta.
The case of Nichols v. Waukesha Canning Co.10 covers the issu-
ance of bonds for a pre-existing debt, not surrendered. The court
say: "Pre-existing debts are neither money nor property capable of
being valued unless actually given up." The court repudiates the
doctrine that corporations may issue bonds as security for an ante-
cedent debt. To be compared with the preceding case is the case of
First Savings and Trust Co. v. Waukesha Canning Co.,12 which is
decided upon a clause in the statute of Wisconsin which is not in-
cluded in the Missouri provision. In the Wisconsin case the trans-
actions may be considered as a purchase of property at not less than
three-fourths of its true value; a compliance with the spirit of the
statute by express contract and obligation.
The last of the Federal cases to be mentioned is that of Kem-
merer v. St. Louis Furnace Co.,'8 in which the facts were identical
with those of the principal case. To determine the application of the
Missouri provisions to the facts, the court say: "A reading of the
plain language of the constitution and statute ought to be sufficient
to uphold the ruling of the court below. We approach the consid-
eration of the question involved with the belief that it is our duty
to give effect to such legislation in all cases where the law applies,
and not by any strained construction to thwart its purpose out of
any consideration of mere business convenience. This case pre-
sents a good illustration of the evil which the lawmaking power
sought to prevent. No consideration whatever passed from Whitney
Kemmerer Co. to the Furnace Co. at the time the bonds were
issued and pledged, and none ever has passed on account of the issue;
still an indebtedness is sought to be proved against the Furnace Co.
If this does not make the amount of the claim fictitious within the
9 Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238.
I°Nichols v. Waukesha Can. Co., 195 Fed. 807.
lIt is true that refunding bonds, substituted for existing valid bonds, are
not within the statute. This is because they add nothing to the prior bonded
debt. They merely take the place of valid bonds already out.
12 First Savings Co. v. Waukesha Co., 211 Fed. 927.
IsKemmerer v. Blast Co., 212 Fed. 63.
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meaning of the law, then we are unable to comprehend the meaning
of the word fictitious."
Concerning the decisions of the courts of the several states it may
be said that the controlling element in most every case holding contra
to the principal case is the difference in the provisions of the con-
stitutions or statutes of the respective states and the Missouri pro-
visions involved in the Mudge case. Some clause is included in each
provision which takes away the stain of evasion, in the face of which
no court could hold an issuance of bonds invalid. The Missouri
provisions are plain and simple, they are not encumbered with any
clause to defeat their purpose; the interpretation is, we think, correct.
And it is our belief that whenever the question which was involved
in the principal case comes before the Supreme Court of Missouri,
the holding of that court will be in accordance with the decision
in the principal case.
We think the conclusion used in the Kemmerer case may well be
used -here; the court say, "We have examined all the cases cited and
have examined all others which we have been able to find, and, with
the exception of Nelson v. Hubbard,14 we find the whole trend of
authority supporting the proposition that there must be a present
consideration (and we would add, the debt not being fictitious), in
order to satisfy the demand of such constitutional and statutory pro-
visions as are here involved. Any other construction simply wastes
away the safeguards which the legislature sought to throw around
the creation of corporate indebtedness."
W. A. R.
14Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238.
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